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Debating Arabic: Governmentality and
Language Controversy in Algeria
Gareth Smail
University of Pennsylvania
In this paper, I examine how discourses of language and citizenship are intertwined
in Algeria. While this issue is typically approached with an eye to how different
linguistic groups compete for power within the domain of language policy, I use
the framework of governmentality (Foucault, 1991) to show a more complicated
picture. Specifically, I argue that political ideologies imply different conceptions of
what it means to teach Algeria’s official language of education, Standard Arabic (alfuṣḥā). While nationalist ideologies envision an Arabic education tied to Islam and/
or the Middle East, neoliberal ideologies reject that model and argue for an Arabic
education that facilitates creativity, individuality, and success on international
measures of learning. I use this framework to analyze multiple perspectives of the
social media scandal of Sabah Boudras, the Algerian school teacher who posted
a video of herself in her classroom and was criticized by the country’s Minister
of Education, Nouria Benghabrit. Through a discourse analysis focused on
narrative positioning across events (Wortham & Reyes, 2015), I show that people
strategically employ these discourses about Arabic teaching to invoke different
configurations of belonging to and exclusion from the Algerian national community.

O

n the first day of school in September, 2016, an Algerian schoolteacher,
Sabah Boudras,1 became an unexpected source of controversy through a
video she posted to Facebook. In it, she recorded herself and her year-one
primary school class as she led the students in chants of classroom values and the
virtues of the classroom’s language, Standard Arabic (which I will refer to as alfuṣḥā).2 After circulating widely on Algerian social media, the video took a sudden
turn toward the political when during a press conference Algeria’s Minister of
Education, Nouria Benghabrit, called it a “disaster”3 and announced she would
refer Boudras for an internal investigation for violating rules prohibiting the filming
of children within state schools (Echorouk News TV, 2016). However, the explicit
reasons behind Benghabrit’s criticisms were quickly drowned out. Within hours
1

Boudras was referred to in the Arabic and French press as “Ustada Sabah,” using her first name and a
title of respect for teachers. I do not use the International Journal of Middle East Studies transliteration
conventions in referring to the name of the controversy and adopt the francophone press transliteration
for ease of reading.
2

In her video, Boudras uses the term اللغة العربية, literally, “the Arabic language,”which refers to the
standardized form of Arabic used for literary purposes and news media. I choose to refer to this
register with the transliterated term al-fuṣḥā ()الفصحى, which literally means “the most eloquent” and is
a contraction of اللغة العربية الفصحى, “the most eloquent Arabic language.” Although linguists have various
names for this Arabic register, including Modern Standard Arabic, Classical Arabic, and Educated
Spoken Arabic, I use the term al-fuṣḥā as it most closely corresponds to one of the primary ways the
register is identified among Algerians.
3

“ ”كارثةThis and all subsequent translations are my own. For in-text translations, the direct quotation is
provided in the original language in the footnote.
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of the minister’s statement, her official Facebook page was overwhelmed with
criticism and expressions of solidarity with Boudras. Teachers posted pictures and
videos of themselves in classrooms in defiance, and a hashtag based on the phrase
“We are all Ms. Sabah”4 was reported to be trending first in Algeria, France, and
other countries (Ech Chorouk Arabic Daily, 2016). A popular rapper, Lofti Double
Kanon, even made a video accusing Benghabrit’s father of being a harki, a French
sympathizer during the Algerian War of Independence. A gendarme was arrested
for posting a picture with his pistol pointed toward Benghabrit’s head.
Benghabrit’s well-known support of multilingualism and preference for
French contrast sharply with the message and style of Boudras’s video, praising
Arabic education. But while this incident was clearly energized by Algeria’s
electric politics surrounding the status of Arabic, French, and Berber, this paper
seeks to highlight a different dimension. Specifically, I analyze Boudras’s video
and two examples of subsequent commentary, showing that they disagree on
how one should embody al-fuṣḥā and its teaching in the classroom. I reflect on
this controversy to ask, why can Boudras’s representation of classroom language
policy be read in such divergent ways? Why are there such different imaginaries of
what it means to teach al-fuṣḥā? The answer, I assert, lies in an exploration of how
discourses of language and citizenship are tied through projects of governmentality
(Foucault, 1991). Specifically, state education is tied to imaginaries about what
it means to construct a nation, and the linguistic performance of teachers and
students serves as an icon of those imaginaries.
This paper is structured as follows. First, I situate Algerian language politics
within the theoretical framework of governmentality, which draws attention to how
discourses on citizenship, labor, and religion vary in how they render language as
an object of instruction and learning. Though Algeria is home to far more than two
such discursive projects, a useful contrast can be drawn between how nationalist
and, more recently, neoliberal political rationalities have considered the teaching
and learning al-fuṣḥā. In the second section, I use discourse analysis to examine
the semiotic content of Boudras’s video and its subsequent uptake, pointing to
the specific, and varying, ways in which al-fuṣḥā is imagined as a language of
Algerian citizenship.
Theoretical Framework: Language, Citizenship, and Governmentality
The central premise of this discussion is that language and citizenship are
linked through historically-situated projects of governmentality, following the
work of Stroud (2007, 2010) and Flores (2014). Governmentality was elaborated
by Michel Foucault as a contraction of “governmental rationality” (Gordon, 1991,
p. 1), referring to the practice of making oneself or others governable. In a series
of lectures, Foucault offers a critical reading of the history of modern states in
which he argues—contrary to liberal and Marxist thought—that the state and
society emerged as concepts together as part of a cultural shift in how power
was exercised, beginning in Europe in the late 18th century. In what he calls the
“’governmentalization’ of the state” (Gordon, 1991, p. 103), this transformation
saw the concerns of statecraft move from consolidating and wielding power of
the sovereign, to developing techniques for managing the behavior of people
4
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and populations, thereby ensuring the security of society. What constitutes
security may be vigorously debated, but the cultural shifts that occur as a part of
governmentalization make it difficult to question the existence of a collective with
shared interests in terms of safety, health, or prosperity.
Foucault’s concept of modern governmentality is “simultaneously
individualizing and totalizing” (Gordon, 1991, p. 36) in that, by constructing society
as an object of both scientific inquiry and management, disciplinary technologies
developed in schools, factories, hospitals, insane asylums, armies, and so forth
came to be used by the state and other institutions as objective ways of identifying
normal and abnormal behavior, and intervening to encourage normality or
castigate abnormality. Power for Foucault is not unidirectional, emanating from
the state, but rather diffuse: Modern political rationality creates subject positions
from which individuals monitor themselves and others. Importantly, as I note
in the methodology below, this stance refocuses analytic attention away from
states or social structure, and toward the often contradictory ways that technical
expertise are taken up and applied through a range of institutions and individuals.
Governmentality studies have important implications for how we understand
debates about citizenship within a nation-state framework. Flores (2013a) and
Stroud (2007) draw on postcolonial theorists to connect the development of
discourses of equal rights to the creation of racialized, impure others, within
both metropolitan and colonial spaces, that needed to be purified for the sound
management of society. Stroud notes that, in the colonial contexts he examines, the
glaring contradictions between the supposed equality of rights-bearing citizens
and the otherness of colonial subjects led to evolving and competing rationalities—
often articulated in terms of modernity and tradition—that sought to draw lines of
inclusion in and exclusion from the citizen community. Indeed, the post-colonial
nation-state system, operating through a “culture of legality” (Stroud, 2007, p.
27), is often presumed to have settled the issue of citizenship based primarily on
territoriality of birth. However, arguments over what makes a citizen good, moral,
authentic, modern, or productive are vigorously debated along many of the same
lines which colonial regimes sought to categorize and differentiate subjects. For
this reason, Flores (2013a) refers to nation-state/colonial governmentality, rather than
differentiating the two.
Language is an important domain through which nation-state/colonial
governmentality has sought to regulate citizenship (Flores, 2013a, 2014; Pennycook,
2002; Stroud, 2007). Stroud’s (2007) study of bilingualism in Mozambique argues
that colonial governmentality resulted in “historical contradictions [that] have
produced distinct and competing ideas of citizenship and rights throughout
colonialism and postcoloniality, and… these contradictions have found semiotic
expression in different notions of bilingualism” (p. 29). In the United States
context, Flores (2014) connects early 19th century efforts to standardize American
English with ideologies that saw labor classes as unfit for political participation.
In this view, the ways in which language is imagined cannot be detached from
the institutions and markets that regulate its learning and use. Within nationstates, this means that discourses about what constitutes a language in the first
place, and what it means to learn it or use it, are imbedded in a broader history of
power relations marked by highly interested notions of inclusion and exclusion in
accessing rights and resources.
55
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Importantly, the political rationalities that have characterized the
governmentalization of states are not fixed, but rather productive of new
rationalities backed by competing interests: “As governmental practices have
addressed themselves in an increasingly immediate way to ‘life’… individuals
have begun to formulate the needs and imperatives of that same life as the basis
for political counter-demands” (Gordon, 1991, p. 5). As will be seen below, in the
case of Algeria, French colonial governmentality led to the emergence of Algerian
nationalist counter-discourse, among others.
Political Rationalities and Language in Algeria
In the following section, I identify two important discourses of language and
citizenship in Algeria—one nationalist and another neoliberal5—that have rendered
language as an object of teaching in different ways. While this outline omits a
great deal of intermediate counter-discourses in Algeria (e.g., the Berber Cultural
Movement), the broad differences sketched here are useful for understanding the
differing perspectives of Boudras’s classroom video, to be analyzed below.
Nation-State/Colonial Governmentality
Algerian nationalist thought emerged in the early 20th century through various
strands that would eventually come to be unified (sometimes violently) under the
aegis of the National Liberation Front6 (FLN) during the War of Independence
(1954–1962). Each strand had its own discourse of linguistic citizenship which
sought to pressure the French administration to facilitate education for Algerians
according to their vision.
One such articulation was that of the Salafiyya Islamic reform movement
initially headed by Abdulhamid Ben Badis and institutionalized in the Association
of Algerian Muslim Ulema7 (AUMA). In the 1920s, Ben Badis and other scholars
who had studied Islamic scholarship abroad began to develop a modernist vision
for Islamic renewal of Algerian society and, as McDougall (2006) argues, sought to
be the sole “Algerian spokesmen for the ‘authentic’ representation of the indigenous
Algerian community” (p. 14). The Salafi movement considered the Algerian
populace to be in a profound state of jahliyya (pre-Islamic ignorance) under French
colonial rule. They saw this manifest not only in the urban elite, who considered
themselves French, but also—and perhaps most urgently—in the Sufi religious
practices that dominated rural life. The AUMA saw themselves as the Algerian
people’s true spiritual and moral guides, enlightening them to an Arabo–Islamic
Algerian identity lost over a century of colonization, and developing a modernist
pedagogical program of classical Arabic and Islamic studies aimed at purging
this ignorance (McDougall, 2006, pp. 110–137). The AUMA’s motto of “Islam is
my religion; Arabic is my language; Algeria is my fatherland” (Ruedy, 2005, pp.
133–135) would come to symbolize the organization’s attempt at articulating a
singular Algerian identity in terms of language, religion, and nation. The AUMA
competed against other moralizing discourses—Islamist, francophone, nationalist,
5

I follow Flores (2013b) in defining neoliberalism as a cultural phenomenon which places an imperative
on markets, institutions, and individuals to flexibly adapt to the imagined needs of global capital.
6
7
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and Marxist—to represent what they considered the true linguistic and cultural
identity of Algerians. Despite their contradictory articulations of Algerian identity,
McDougall (2011) argues that both the AUMA and the francophone intellectuals
shared a “‘salvific’ cultural politics” (p. 256) in which they viewed colonial
Algeria—in particular the cultural and linguistic practices of Algerian Muslims—
as backward and in need of purification through knowledge gained abroad, be
it “technocratic” on one hand, or Islamic on the other (pp. 259–260). After 1954,
the FLN would succeed in co-opting or eliminating each of these strains, but not
without appropriating the same cultural politics and their attendant discourses of
language and citizenship.
Even though Algeria had not yet been accorded the legal status of an
independent nation, clearly the project of nation-state/colonial governmentality
was already under way. While many French and even some Algerian intellectuals
denied that Algerian society had any history prior to French colonialism, the
AUMA and the FLN produced a counter-discourse which forcefully asserted its
rights and its religious and cultural unity. A clear example of the productive
nature of Foucauldian power, this counter-discourse lent itself to rapid uptake
of nation-building disciplinary technologies, especially immediately after
independence in 1962.
The effects were felt in the domain of language education. Prominent
leaders of the postcolonial state saw al-fuṣḥā as their language, even as they
and most other Algerians were educated primarily in French. Benrabah’s (2004,
2013) comprehensive histories of state language policies describe an increasing
radicalism on the part of the state in the first decades after independence. Ahmed
Ben Bella’s presidency (1962–1965) generally empowered those in favor of
“Arabicization,” or a gradualist transition from French to Arabic (Benrabah, 2004,
pp. 53–54), and acknowledged the enormous logistical challenges of expanding
education in a language that few Algerians had mastered. Nonetheless, not even
the gradualist vision during this early period tolerated a role for the Algerian
colloquial Arabic or Algeria’s minority languages, a position which contributed
to the rending of the wartime alliance of Kabyle and Arabophone leadership.8
The government imported Arabic teachers from Egypt and Syria, under the logic
that, by the nature of their nationality, they would be prepared to teach Arabic
to Algerians (Benrabah, 2013, pp. 58, 62). Following the 1965 coup d’état and the
ascendance of Houari Boumédiène’s presidency (1965–1978), proponents of more
rapid and radical “Arabization” (a process of cultural transformation beyond
only linguistic accommodation) became increasingly influential of language-ineducation policy (Benrabah, 2013, p. 57–59). Boumédiène further accelerated this
process in the early 1970s, as he promoted a program of cultural transformation
(1971 was dubbed “the year of Arabization”) to marginalize leftist and Berberist
opponents (Roberts, 2003, pp. 11–13).
8

Kabyles are one of several Berber linguistic groups in Algeria. For example, in 1962 Ben Bella
eliminated the department of Berber Studies at the Univesity of Tizi Ouzou in Kabylia, viewing an
emphasis on any identify outside the purview of the FLN to be an affront to national (read Arab) unity
(Benrabah, 2013). Partly in response to these mounting tensions, Hocine Ait Ahmed, a Kabyle member
of the FLN’s founding Neuf Historiques, staged a rebellion in Tizi Ouzou against Ben Bella. Ait Ahmed’s
Social Forces Front (Front de Forces Socialistes, FFS) was quickly subdued and he fled the country, but it
was a the first in a series of demands of the Berber community for recognition.
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Crisis of the State and Neoliberal Governmentality
From the 1970s into the late 1990s, the Algerian state continued to Arabize
sections of primary, secondary, and tertiary education as was politically expedient
and practically feasible. This period was also marked by the proliferation of
counter-discourses that challenged the FLN’s premise of Algeria’s linguistic,
religious, and cultural unity, and especially, the state’s position as its guarantor.
This was epitomized in the cycles of violence between Islamists and the state in the
1990s, but also notable in the successful demands of various Berber communities to
ensure local control of their education. Instead of analyzing each of these projects
and their corresponding political rationalities, I focus in this section on a more
recent shift in discourse emanating from the highest levels of the state, notably the
presidency and the current minister of education, Nouria Benghabrit.
The ascent of Abdelaziz Bouteflika to the presidency in 1999 brought the
conclusion of the armed conflict that had profoundly shaken Algerian society.
Bouteflika’s approach to language policy and language use was also a significant
departure from the state Arabism that had dominated before (Benrabah, 2004,
2013). Bouteflika, a former diplomat who had spent much of the post-Boumédiène
years abroad, spoke in French unapologetically. Though rebuked, he shunned
his critics, publicly recognizing the influence of French culture on Algeria and
notoriously stating: “For Algeria, I will speak French, Spanish and English, and, if
necessary, Hebrew” (Benrabah, 2004, p. 28).
At the same time, Bouteflika’s discourse emphasized a need to improve
the quality of the education system, claiming that Algerian youth “master
no language”9 (Métaoui, 2011; see also Benrabah, 2013, p. 77) in the country’s
Arabized public schools. Bouteflika charged an evaluative body, the National
Commission for the Reform of the Educational System10 (CNRSE), with developing
recommendations for reforms. The CNRSE strategy focused mostly on a menu
of reforms that echoed global discourses on educational quality at the time:
upgrading the quality of instruction by requiring higher teacher certifications;
reforming curricula to focus on learner-competencies; restructuring primary
school years to improve the efficiency of teacher distribution (World Bank, 2007,
p. 135). Controversially, the report recommended a reversal on several key aspects
of the 1990s Arabization laws, including teaching secondary science in French and
introducing French sooner. These provisions were firmly rejected by both FLN
conservatives and Islamists, even provoking a fatwa, or religious ruling, against
bilingual education. After significant pressure, the government suspended the
reforms in 2001 (Benrabah, 2013, p. 159).
Despite this setback, the presidency has maintained, and incrementally
implemented, a more pluralistic vision for language in education policy, centered
on a discourse of improving quality. Benghabrit’s tenure, which began in 2014,
has been emblematic of these efforts. A Sorbonne-trained sociologist, Benghabrit
ran a reputable research center in Oran before being tapped for the post. She
is known for her preference for French in public discourse, spurring critics to
circulate YouTube videos mocking her lack of eloquence in Arabic. Her push to
transform Algerian schools—in accordance with the CNRSE—has focused on
9

“Ils ne maîtrisent aucune langue”

10
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teacher qualifications and curricular reforms for language education, which has
led to bitter confrontations with Islamists and conservatives (Alitat, 2016; Meddi,
2016). When the leader of Algeria’s largest Islamist party, the Movement for a
Society of Peace, called her a “real danger to future generations”11 (Dasa, 2016)
and accused her of being behind an attempt to “French-ify the education system”12
(Bouwasta, 2016), Benghabrit responded, “our main enemy today is mediocrity”13
(Meddi, 2016). Benghabrit has also described the education system as “producing
parrots”14 (Alitat, 2016).
Discourse on mediocrity dovetails with a larger current of francophone
Algerian intellectuals that sees Arabization as partly responsible for the violence
of the 1990s that persecuted them (Alitat, 2016). From 1992 to roughly 2002,
Algeria was the site of cyclical violence by armed Islamist groups that rejected the
military’s seizure of power and clandestine government agencies that resulted,
by some estimates, in nearly 200,000 civilian deaths (Roberts, 2003). Francophone
academics, intellectuals and journalists were particularly targeted and many were
either killed or fled the country. For many of those that survived the 1990s in
Algeria, what they see as Islamic fundamentalism is an unequivocally dangerous
and pathological ideology.
Talk of improving education quality belies its own ideology of language
and education. It partakes in a global shift in the political economy of education
reform, away from ensuring universal access and towards fostering competitive
workers in globalized labor markets (Mundy, 1998). Beginning in the early 1980s,
post-colonial governments began to fall into debt crises as the commodity prices
upon which their economies were dependent collapsed. Algeria was one of the
many Global South countries to enter a debt management relationship with the
International Monetary Fund in the 1980s, which capped off a longer-term effort
by the Chadli administration (1978–1992) to undo the state-led socialist program
erected by his predecessor Boumédiène (Evans & Phillips, 2007). The implication
for education was that precisely as the cohorts of Arabized students were swelling,
the government ceased to guarantee their employment (Gafaiti, 2002). Discourse
about education quality—namely that pedagogy must be of a particular nature
(usually described as learner-centered)—emerged worldwide partly as a proposed
solution to this problem (Heyneman, 2003; Ginsberg & Megahed, 2008).
The co-emergence of a political economy of austerity and a discourse on
educational quality parallel Flores’s (2013b) discussion of neoliberalism, namely
the “corporatization of society” accompanied by “the corporatization of the
individual subject” (p. 504). Because formal education is the site of individual
subject formation par excellence within the nation-state framework, the ability of
schooling to foster what Flores, citing Foucault (2008), calls an enterprising self gains
increased prominence. In turn, it shifts the onus of remedying unemployment
away from the state and toward teachers and students, while downplaying the
forces (like corruption and a history of colonialism) that structure the current labor
market. Moreover, it assumes a causal relationship between types of teaching
(learner-centeredness), leading to skills (language mastery, creativity, problem11
12
13
14

“”]إنها] متثل خطرا حقيقيا عىل األجيال
“”فرنسة املظومة الرتبوية

“Notre ennemi principal aujourd’hui, c’est la médiocrité.”
“elle produit des perroquets”
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solving) and then to employment opportunities (with global companies) with little
evidence behind each supposed connection (Alexander, 2008).
The implications of this ideology are evident in Bouteflika and Benghabrit’s
characterization of Algerian youth as linguistically inadequate (i.e., youth “master
no language”). Unlike the plurilingualism ideology that Flores examines—one that
advocates for a repertoire- or skill-based view of language—the quality paradigm
views competence in terms of whole languages (French or Arabic), which good
citizens should be able to speak purely. Thus, Benghabrit also relies on standard
language ideologies to engage in a similar process of creating “hierarchically
ranked approximations of belonging to and exclusion from” (Rosa, 2016, p. 163)
the Algerian political community.
Methodology
Governmentality provides a theoretical link between language, education,
and citizenship. Language education—especially in compulsory state education—
is not a neutral act, but rather tied to political rationalities that arrange belonging
to and exclusion from the national community in different ways. In what follows,
I analyze the Ustada Sabah controversy to show how these political rationalities
yield different understandings of what Arabic is and how it should be taught.
The frame of governmentality orients us to “the operation of discourses,
educational practices, and language use” (Pennycook, 2002, p. 19) rather than social
structure and explicit policy. For Foucault, power operates in a diffuse, relational
network rather than emanating from a single actor. The implication is that social
structures like the state, language, or nation do not have essences that carry over
from one interaction to the next. Rather, they are continually reproduced within
interactions through reference to discourses of legality, language, and national
community. The “’govermentalization’ of the state” (Gordon, 1991, p. 103) is a
process by which such discourses are increasingly directed at the individual in a
way that makes them appear natural. Despite this, contradictory discourses often
allow individuals to believably position themselves and others differently vis-àvis the state, a language or the national community.
To examine how this plays out in Algeria and the Ustada Sabah controversy, I
employ a form of discourse analysis developed by Wortham and Reyes (2015) for
analyzing how speech events (like Boudras’s video and Benghabrit’s criticism) are
characterized in subsequent discourse to achieve social effects (such as claiming
the right to speak for Algerians). They draw on a distinction between the narrated
event (i.e., the topics of conversation) and the narrating event in which participants
attempt to achieve some social outcome (e.g., winning an argument, exclusion or
inclusion, etc.) through their characterization of the narrated event. This distinction
builds off the observation that narration never occurs in a social vacuum, but rather
has “interactional as well as representational functions” (Wortham, 2000, p. 158).
For this reason, acts of narration are inevitably shaped by how narrators attempt to
socially position themselves and others in the moment of speech. This is manifest in
how narrators choose both to structure and to enact the past events they reference.
A critical subject of investigation, then, is how people play with the ambiguity
of signs and language—how they can index or point to multiple meanings—to
characterize past events or narratives in a way that suits their immediate goals.
60
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This methodology is useful for the present analysis because it provides a
framework for how people can strategically use the political rationalities discussed
above. Specifically, the narrators discussed below invoke Algerian nationalist or
neoliberal discourses in order to differently “voice” (Wortham & Reyes, 2015, p.
19) Boudras and Benghabrit as examples of social stereotypes (Agha, 2005). As I
will demonstrate, these voicing strategies also have social effects in terms of how
the speakers position themselves with respect to the national community and
speakers of Arabic.
Analysis
Wortham and Reyes (2015) delineate three phases to their discourse analysis
which I follow below. The first phase is mapping the narrated event, or identifying
the “characters, objects, and events” (p. 42) that are discussed by the narrating
event. For the purposes of this paper, I identify Boudras’s video and Benghabrit’s
castigation as the narrated event, which is subsequently characterized as a single
feud in narrating events on social media, on television, and written press. The
second phase is identifying, construing, and configuring indexical signs. This phase
is concerned with how people in the narrating event pick out (identify) which
signs are relevant in the narrated event, how they interpret (construe) what those
signs mean, and how they align those signs with others (configure) within a social
and historical context. I highlight two narrating events: a television interview with
a supporter of Boudras and a later opinion article reflecting on Arabic education.
While these events identify similar indexical signs as relevant in the narrated
event, their main actors construe and configure them in different ways. The final
phase is interpreting social action, which means analyzing what effects are socially
achieved by narrating events in a particular way. Does the narrator come off as an
authority? A hypocrite? Are stereotypes about the narrated characters confirmed
or challenged? In the case at hand, these social effects involve differently drawing
the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion from the national community.
Mapping the Narrated Event
On the morning of September 6th, 2016, Sabah Boudras, a schoolteacher in a
village in the Algerian state of Batna, produced a video, recorded on her phone, in
which she shares her approach for values education15 (abouisraa 18, 2016; Excerpt
1). As she explains in the video, her plan for the year was to begin each day with
five minutes of call-and-response questions based around classroom values,
including truthfulness, cooperation, and loyalty.16
Excerpt 1
Line Translation

15
16

1

Boudras (B): Hello praise be to God. Welcome

2

to this first broadcast directly from the school.

3

Today was the beginning of the school year

Transcription

السالم عليكم رحمة الله وبركاته
يف هذا البث األول من مبارش من املدرسة
اليوم كانت بداية الدخول املدريس

مادة الرتبية الخلوقية
الوفاء،  التعاون،الصدق
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4

and of course I’m with all of them

5

the rascals, the sweetest rascals, that I love

6

We expect this year inshallah to

7

be a happy school year

8

Inshallah God will trust us with a year of success

9

We open with a set of questions

17

…
10

The Arabic language is the most beautiful…

11

Students (S): of the world’s languages!

12

B: Good, the Arabic language is

13

the most beautiful of the languages of..

14

S: the world!

15

B: This year my language will be…

16

S: Arabic!

17

B: And we won’t speak any language but…

18

S: The

19

B: Ara…

20

S: Arabic!

21

B: Good, we won’t speak any language but Arabic

22

Ah… another question

23

A language which God has given a letter19

24

S: Arabic!

26

B: Good. What is the language of the people of heaven?

27

S: Arabic!

28

B: Good. The language of the people of heaven is

29

Arabic.

طبعا انا معهم جميعا
املشاغب انه احىل مشاغب أعزه
نلتقي هذا العام إن شاء الله راح
يكون موسم دريس موسم يل الفرح
إن شاء الله الرب يكل بنا النجاح
مجموع من األسئلة حنى نفتحو بها
 أغنى،اللغ ُة العربية
لغات العامل
 اللغ ْة العربية.جيد
هي أغنى لغات
العامل
هذا العام سيكو ُن لساين
العربية
18

وال نع َرب بغريِ اللغ ِة
ال
العر

العربية
ِ
جيد وال نع َرب بغريِ اللغة العربية
اه سؤال آجر

لغ ٌة حباها الله حرفا
العربية
 ما هي لغ ُة أهلِ الجنة.جيد
العربية
 لغ ُة أهلِ الجنة هي اللغ ُة.جيد
العربية

(abouisraa 18, 2016)
The obvious characters in Boudras’s video are herself and the students
she leads in the call and response activity. The contours of Boudras’s video
as an event are inherent in the medium of a Facebook video itself, which has
physical and stylistic limits on length. It also fits into a selfie genre in which
Boudras’s face is always present in the shot, with her students behind her.
The video contains at least two distinct audiences, the students in the video
and the network on Facebook. In lines 1–9, Boudras addresses the network on
Facebook, characterizing the event as a “broadcast” (line 2) and explaining to
17
18
19

literally, if God wills it

Case endings reflect those spoken by Boudras in the video, which may not be standard.

Boudras is referring to a line of poem in praise of Arabic by Syrian poet Jack Sabri Shamas. She
omits the word “everlasting” which appears in the poem (لغة حباها الله حرفا خالدا, “A language that God has
given an everlasting letter”). Thank you to Lamia Lahrach for pointing this out.
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the audience how they should interpret the subsequent performance of her and
her students. In lines 10–29, Boudras addresses the students through the call and
response activity. At this point, her shift in language corresponds to the change
in audience. Whereas in lines 1–9 she uses a register of al-fuṣḥā reminiscent of
television broadcasts, with colloquial markers (line 6: راح, “going to;” line 9: حنى
نفتحو, “we open”) mixed in, in lines 10–29 she speaks in a much more formalized
register, including articulating ending vowels that typically indicate one is
reading a text aloud.
Once posted on Facebook, the video quickly spread through Algerian
networks. The same day, the video’s popularity was raised by a reporter in a press
conference held by Algerian Minister of Education Nouria Benghabrit. Flanked by
her deputy, Benghabrit responds in a mix of French and Arabic (both al-fuṣḥā and
Algerian dialect) by reprimanding Boudras (Excerpt 2).
Excerpt 2
Line Translation

Transcription

1

Benghabrit (B): and we just saw on

et nous venons de voir à travers

2

ah Facebook

eh Facebook

3

now young teachers

maintenant des jeunes enseignantes

4

with a cell phone, a selfie

avec le portable en selfie

5

while speaking with their students

en train de parler avec leurs élèves

6

Deputy (D): turning their back to them

en leurs tournant le dos

7

B: turning their back to them

en leurs tournant le dos

8

a complete disaster

9

and I ask from you

10

what is going to happen is

ce qui va se passer c’est qu’il y aura

11

an investigation

une enquête

12

and if the search substantiates the matter

13

there will be a disciplinary commission,

il y aura la commission de discipline,

14

that’s all

c’est tout

15

we are in a sensitive sector

16

it’s necessary that any person that goes into

17

a given job

18

respect the rules

يش كارثة عىل كل حال
وانا نطلب منكم

وإذا البحت يحقق هذا الواقع

حساس
ّ راحنا يف قطاع

ال بد كل شخص يدخل يف

وظيفة معيّنة

أن يحرتم القوانني

(Echorouk News TV, 2016)
In this event, the characters consist of Benghabrit, her deputy, the press corps,
and the general public audience that would see it broadcast. Here, Benghabrit
explicitly objects not to the content of the video, but its filming in the first place.
She refers to the video (lines 1–7), stating that it is a “disaster” (line 7) and implying
that it violates the rules of the job (lines 15–18).
There are multiple levels of the narrated/narrating dynamic at work, both
within Boudras’s video itself and between the two events. For the purposes of this
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analysis, I will take as a starting point a view of Boudras’s video and Benghabrit’s
comments as a single narrated event—seen as a confrontation—which generates
considerable subsequent commentary. Indeed, as described above, variations on
the hashtag “We are all Ms. Sabah” (implying against Benghabrit) became some of
the widest circulating hashtags in multiple countries that day (Ech Chorouk Arabic
Daily, 2016). In the narrating events that I identify, Boudras’s and Benghabrit’s use
of signs come to mean different things in service of different representations of
language and citizenship in Algeria.
Narrating Events: Selecting, Construing, and Configuring Indexicals
Out of the cacophony of commentary on the Boudras–Benghabrit scandal, I
have chosen two narrating events that achieve different social effects through their
characterization of the confrontation. These include (a) a street interview by the
online channel El Bilad TV with supporters of Boudras and (b) an op-ed article
some months later in Le Monde by a group of Franco-Algerian intellectuals. These
are not by any means representative, and indeed, the latter should be considered a
minority voice. I chose them in part because of their accessibility online and in part
because they are a particularly illustrative contrast in how differently-interested
political rationalities can construct Arabic as an object of language instruction in
different ways.
The first was published on YouTube one day after Benghabrit’s comments. In
it, a reporter is stationed on the street in downtown Algiers, followed by clips of
ten passersby who comment on the scandal. All the interviewees express support
for Boudras except one, who nonetheless is more equivocal than supportive of
Benghabrit. The interviewees seem to be selected to represent a range of social
types, including men and women, different ages, those who choose to speak in
French, Algerian colloquial Arabic and al-fuṣḥā, and even English. In Excerpt 3, an
older man characterizes Boudras as “innocent” (lines 1 & 13), implying that her
classroom activity was within her right (line 23) as a teacher. He also refers to her
as speaking “the language of the Quran” and speaking al-fuṣḥā (lines 14–16). He
has a long white beard (often an emblem of piety) and though he is clearly agitated
(evident in his prosody), he speaks in slow, deliberate al-fuṣḥā, even self-correcting
markers of Algerian dialect as he goes (line 4).
Excerpt 3
Line Translation
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1

Man: This teacher… is innocent

2

and we are with her

3

and this teacher didn’t… I mean

4

I observed last year or ah last year

5

I saw on TV that

6

a teacher or I don’t…

7

but in an educational institution

8

they sang… created a singing video

Transcription

هذ األستاذة … بارئة
ونحن معها
وهذ األستاذة مل ت ُق … يعني
الحظ العام يل فات كنت يعني العام املايض
يعني الحظ يف التلفزة أنه
… أستاذة وال ما
يف مؤسسة تربوية املهم
انه قاموا بغناء بفيديو غناء
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9

da… wey wey20… [Host: dancing] dancing yes

10

and she didn’t address it

11

and the minister didn’t lift a finger

12

we are saying to Madam Minister

13

this teacher is innocent

14

and she spoke the language of the Quran

15

and she spoke al-fuṣḥā

16

she said, yes! I will speak al-fuṣḥā.

17

It’s a fact

18

and with students

19

and not in the street

20

this is an educational institution

21

meaning that this teacher

22

is an educator…

23

she has a right to bring up a generation

َر … واي واي … [رقص] رقص نعم
ومل تكلّم
ومل تحرك ساكنا الوزيرة
نقول للسيدة الوزيرة
هذ األستاذة بريئة
وتكلمت لغة القرآن
وتكلمت اللغة العربية الفصحى
قالت نعم! سأتكلم اللغة العربية الفصحى
هي حقيقة
ومع التالميذ
وليس بالشارع
وبانها مؤسسة تربوية
ومبعناها هذ املعلمة
… مربّية
ترب جيل
ّ لها حق أن

(El Bilad TV, 2016)
What signs in Boudras’s video allow for this portrayal of Boudras as
“innocent”? Boudras leads her students in describing Arabic as “the most
beautiful language in the world” (Excerpt 1, lines 10–14), and “the language of the
people of heaven” (lines 26–29). Here, Boudras references a common discourse in
the Arab world that sees Arabic as sacred (Boutieri, 2013; Haeri, 2003; Suleiman,
2002), and equates contemporary al-fuṣḥā with the language of the Quran. Haeri’s
(2003) ethnography of language use in Egypt demonstrates the pervasiveness of
this discourse: Despite formal written Arabic having proliferated in registers with
the emergence of education, journalism, media, and the bureaucratic state, the
legitimacy of Arabic has often rested on its reference to Arabo–Islamic civilization
generally, and Islam in particular. This has meant projects of modernizing Arabic
beginning in the late 19th century (which would become the basis of state
Arabization projects like Algeria’s) have not only continued to reference Classical
Arabic in form, but also adamantly maintain that it represents a single language.
Boudras’s and the man’s use of the term Arabic (al-luġha al-ʿarabiya; Excerpt 1,
lines 10, 12, 21, 28–29; Excerpt 3, lines 15–16) is exemplary, as it is shorthand for the
specific formal register al-fuṣḥā which typically contrasts with colloquial Arabic,
darija in the case of Algeria. For Boudras, values education implies speaking
this register of Arabic, as she has her students recite “this year my language
will be Arabic” (Excerpt 1, lines 15–16) and “I won’t speak any language other
than Arabic” (lines 17–21). Thus, Boudras references two thirds of the AUMA’s
motto: “Islam is my religion; Arabic is my language; Algeria is my fatherland”
(Ruedy, 2005, pp. 133–135). The third is implied as she represents a state agent in
an Algerian public school. For the man being interviewed, these actions model an
educator (Excerpt 3, lines 21–23) doing the right thing by fostering these values in
later generations.
20

Wey wey is a specific dance that had become popular the year before.
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Conversely, the man presents a configuration that shows Benghabrit to be a
hypocrite, presumably targeting Boudras because she objected to the teacher’s
support of Arabic. He relates a story (Excerpt 3, lines 4–11) in which a video of
dancing—which he implies is either frivolous or even morally suspect—is shot
within a school and the minister did not react. Thus, the explicit reason for
Benghabrit’s opening an investigation—that Boudras filmed within a school—
is called into question. Moreover, this characterization aligns Benghabrit’s
known preference for French and her history of confrontation with Islamists and
conservatives over the religious and linguistic content of the curriculum.
The second narrating event occurred a little more than two months later, on
November 22, when the French newspaper Le Monde published a piece by six
Algerian and Franco-Algerian intellectuals titled “The Algerian School between
incompetence and obscurantism”21 (Djebbar et al., 2016). The authors argue that the
project of Arabization has been commandeered by Islamic fundamentalists who
indoctrinate children through memorization of dogma that vitiates critical thinking.
They decry contemporary Arabic instruction in Algerian schools as, “without
content”22 and resulting in educational mediocrity: “Arabic is, for us, poorly spoken,
poorly learned, because it is without content, poor and dry like a net in a Saharan
river bed”23 (Djebbar et al., 2016). In doing so, they make explicit reference to Boudras:
It is often said of the Prophet Mohammed that he preferred Arabic of all
the languages because it is ‘the language of the people of heaven’. But this
pseudo-hadith24 is considered, even among the grand masters of Hanbali
jurisprudence, a ‘forgery’. Yet this purported hadith is rehabilitated by
neosalafism, which makes it the emblem of its tactical religiosity. … It is
clear that the discourse of the latter has become orthodoxy in the Algerian
school, as is evident in the video put online by the instructor on the first
day of this school year, 2016–2017.25 (Djebbar et al., 2016)

Here, the authors paint Boudras as a different character than those who expressed
solidarity with her. Boudras is configured as an “instructrice” (“instructor,” a lower
status term than مربّية, “educator,” or أستاذة, “teacher/professor,” used by the man in
Excerpt 3 [line 12]) who channels a false and opportunistic ideology of religious
zealots. Her statement “Arabic is the language of the people of heaven” (Excerpt 1,
lines 26–29), repeated by Djebbar et al., is no longer an unproblematic justification
for teaching the language to Algerian children, but rather represents a “forgery”
contested by even the most conservative institutions of Islamic jurisprudence.
Additionally, while her use of highly formal Arabic forms in the call and response
21
22
23

“L’école algérienne entre incompétence et obscurantisme”
“sans contenu”

“La langue arabe est, chez nous, mal parlée, mal apprise, parce qu’elle est sans contenu, aussi pauvre et sèche
qu’un filet d’oued saharien.”
24

The Hadith is a diverse collection of acts and sayings of the Prophet Mohammed which are important
for Islamic scholarship.
25

“On a bien fait dire au prophète Mahomet que, de toutes les langues, c’est l’arabe qui était sa préférée parce
qu’elle est ‘la langue des gens du paradis’. Mais ce pseudo-hadith est considéré, y compris parmi les grands
maîtres de l’école juridique hanbalite, comme une ‘forgerie’. Or ce même prétendu hadith est réhabilité par le
néosalafisme, qui en a fait l’emblème de sa religiosité tactique. ... Force est de constater que c’est le discours de
ces derniers qui tient lieu de religion à l’école algérienne, comme en témoigne la vidéo mise en ligne par une
institutrice le jour même de la rentrée scolaire de cette année 2016–2017.”
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activity is the epitome of al-fuṣḥā for the man in Excerpt 3, the very same activity
is construed by the authors as “without content,” having children memorize
ideologically charged statements without using the language to think.
While Benghabrit’s criticism does not factor explicitly as a narrated event, the
article is clearly a defense of her administration, using the same vocabulary of
mediocrity as Benghabrit herself. In this sense, then, its attempt to intellectually
discredit the image of Boudras as a dutiful educator mirrors the discursive work
of her proponents in which Boudras’s image had been presented in large part as a
criticism of Benghabrit.
Interpreting Social Action
What social action do the interviewee and the group of intellectuals achieve in
their characterization of Boudras’s Arabic teaching as the work of, respectively, a
dutiful educator or an incompetent zealot? The man in Excerpt 3 twice uses the firstperson plural (lines 2 & 12) to include himself in an unidentified group (“We” the
people? “We” a political party?) that is aligned with Boudras against Benghabrit.
This “we” and Boudras, in their support of this scriptural and religiously-inclined
form of Arabic, have the right to bring up the next generation of Algerians. Excluded
from this community is what he characterizes as the hypocritical francophone elite
(of whom Benghabrit is a stereotypical example in this characterization). Algerian
colloquial Arabic and minority languages like Kabyle, Chaoui, and others, are not
mentioned. As such, they may not be grounds for exclusion, but are certainly not
a defining characteristic of this conception of citizenship. The role of schooling, in
this view, is to expose generations of Algerian children—whatever their linguistic
background—to Arabo–Islamic values through formalized Arabic.
By contrast, Djebber et al. align Boudras with a group of fanatical ideologues
that is outside mainstream Islam, yet nonetheless taking over the schooling system
(and Boudras’s video is presented as evidence of it). Their use of first-person plural
primarily identifies the authors as group of commentators (“for us”) possessing the
intellectual gravitas to diagnose Boudras’ Arabic teaching as a social problem and
put it into proper context. They similarly position Arabic instruction as necessary
for the health of the Algerian nation, but in this case Boudras’s teaching embodies
the reasons for the country’s intellectual mediocrity. Their authority is reinforced
by the fact that that these academics write in French in a decidedly not-mediocre
publication, Le Monde.
Discussion and Conclusions
These two accounts of the Boudras–Benghabrit scandal correspond to different
models of ideal Algerian citizenship and what threats are preventing the education
system from producing it. The man in the television interview (Excerpt 3) articulates
a model closest to the nationalist discourse of language and citizenship, which sees
the Algerian nation as fundamentally Arab and Islamic. He aligns the model of
Arabic teaching embodied by Boudras’s video with these concepts. Much like the
AUMA 60 years ago, Boudras and the man see education in al-fuṣḥā as necessary for
the religious and moral cultivation of Algerian culture. He notes that as a teacher in a
state institution, Boudras “has the right to bring up a generation” (Excerpt 3, line 23)
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through what he recognizes as her use of al-fuṣḥā. Meanwhile he casts Benghabrit’s
hypocrisy as a threat to reproducing this type of citizenship, permitting the frivolous
(dancing) while cracking down on the legitimate (Boudras’s al-fuṣḥā). Importantly,
he positions himself among the “we” that makes demands for al-fuṣḥā on Benghabrit
on behalf of the Algerian people (lines 2 & 12), and performs that social position
through his beard and careful use of the register. By contrast, Djebber et al. articulate
a model that parallels a neoliberal view of citizenship, contextualized by Algeria’s
recent history of violence. In this case, religious extremism presents the ultimate
threat to the Algerian nation and critical (i.e., secular) thinking is its antidote. For
them, Boudras’s Arabic teaching and its glorification are evidence of the stifling of
critical thinking within schools, especially through her having children memorize
slogans that they consider ideological. This contrasts with the Algerian ruling class’s
project of liberalizing the economy, reducing labor market reliance on government
employment, and eliminating what it sees as mediocrity from the education system.
They position themselves as experts, writing in sophisticated French and possessing
credentials from abroad, able to diagnose Algeria’s ideological problems and
propose solutions (like marginalizing religious conservatives) that, not incidentally,
facilitate their own ability to have a place in Algerian society.
The concept of governmentality allows us to see continuity across these
bitterly opposed positions. In both cases, the type of Arabic that is taught in public
schools is critical for the health of Algerian society. The “’governmentalization’ of
the state” (Gordon, 1991, p. 103) makes it increasingly imperative for society at
large that Algerian children are able to perform a particular type of Arabic, even
as parties disagree on what that looks like. Indeed, the way in which Boudras
uses Arabic—whether it is considered exemplary or mediocre—becomes a tool for
defining who should be included or viewed as a threat to the Algerian community.
Moreover, the fact that both parties are ostensibly referring to the same standard
language of Algerian schooling (viz., al-fuṣḥā) suggests, following Rosa (2016),
that standardization is never exclusively a linguistic process. Rather, it implies a
parallel social process of drawing social boundaries.
Language governmentality is not totalizing, despite the continuity evidenced
here. Many Algerians reject the social and linguistic boundaries drawn by these
ideologies, and find ways both mundane and artistic to transgress them (Benrabah,
2013; Ouaras, 2015). Indeed, even in the El Bilad TV clip, the interviewees excluded
from this analysis represent a panoply of Algerian voices more diverse than the
ones that formed the focus of the study. Nonetheless, the ideologies cited here are
particularly powerful precisely because resources of the state and international
organizations have prioritized them.
The pairing of governmentality and discourse analysis is a complement to
ecological studies of language policy (Hult, 2010) in that it shows how power can
emerge from diffuse networks, rather than from institutional or social structures.
Indeed, in the case at hand, the Arabization policy is sustained in part by
groundswell from teachers and supporters of Boudras, despite the fact that it is
viewed critically from the top. Discourse analysis shows how political rationalities
are not totalizing, but rather used by individuals to achieve social effects. Still, the
addition of governmentality draws specific attention to how state education—and
the battles over what it should constitute—are tied to social processes of regulating
citizens and subjects.
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